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ABSTRACT
In the Centuries!of!Theology 1.48-50, Maximus states that there are two kinds of works 
that belong to God: one which corresponds to beings having a temporal, finite begin-
ning, and one which corresponds to perfections of beings which have no beginning and 
are therefore eternal. Maximus labels the latter as participated beings (!"#$ %&'&(#)) 
and the former as participating beings (!"#$ %&#*+,"#$), with God transcending both 
as their cause. The structure of God-as-cause, participated beings, and participating 
beings matches Proclus’ three-fold structure of participation with the ontological cate-
gories of unparticipated, participated, and participating. While Maximus borrows the 
basic language and structure from Proclus, he makes certain minor but significant dif-
ferences, particularly in how the participated beings both relate to their source in God 
and in their status of existence. This article thus sets out to analyze 1.48-50 in the 
general context of the Centuries!of!Theology,!considering how Maximus conceives of 
the ontological distinctions between God and God’s works. A comparison with Proclus’ 
understanding of participation follows, particularly from Proclus’ Elements!of!Theology, 
Prop. 23, which succinctly states the three-term distinction of participation. The resulting 
comparison shows that Proclus’ framework of participation is flattened for Maximus, 
where the participated works represent multiple properties distinct in kind from the 
unparticipated, while God fits analogously in the status of the unparticipated. The 
underlying ontology supports Maximus’ implicit denial that such participated entities 
represent distinct divinities, as they do for Proclus, while Maximus’ assertion of God’s 
transcendence is still secured with the ontological distinction between the participated 
works and their unparticipated cause.
Introduction
St Maximus the Confessor has been considered in his various uses and 
applications of Neoplatonism, in good part thanks to his appropriation of 
Pseudo-Dionysius.1 With this in mind, some passages of interest stand out in 
the Centuries!of!Theology 1.48-50 (PG 90, 1100C-1101B), where Maximus 
1 See, for instance, Carlos Steel, ‘Maximus Confessor on Theory and Praxis. A Commentary 
on Ambigua Ad Johannem VI (10) 1-19’, in Thomas Bénatouïl, Mauro Bonazzi (eds), Theoria,!
Praxis,!and!the!Contemplative!Life!After!Plato!and!Aristotle (Leiden, 2012) and Stephen Gersh, 
Studia!Patristica LXXV, 137-148.
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employs a three-term scheme of participation between God and his eternal and 
temporal works.2 This has striking parallels to Proclus’ developed doctrine of 
participation involving three elements, between the unparticipated, participated, 
and participating entities in a given order. While the passage in Maximus has 
been considered in light of its ties to St Gregory Palamas’ famous doctrine of 
the essence (,-./$) and energies (0"*12&3$3) of God, no analysis has been 
made of the influence and reception of Proclus in this passage. In this article I 
wish to set out a close comparison between the two figures’ frameworks, begin-
ning with an analysis of the Centuries!of!Theology passage followed by an 
overview and comparison with Proclus’ division of participation in his meta-
physics. While Maximus essentially adapts the same framework from Proclus, 
he makes certain, crucial changes in the structure by simplifying the hierarchy 
of participated beings and allowing multiple participants to share in the same 
participated property. Perhaps more interesting is Maximus’ implicit denial of 
self-subsistence to participated entities, which is in contrast to Proclus’ view 
that participated entities are self-subsistent in their superiority to participants 
and simultaneous distinction from the unparticipated source. This may be why 
Maximus can deny divinity to the participated entities, unlike Proclus, and 
implicitly maintain that they are mediated, participable aspects of God – per-
haps the most striking difference one can see in Maximus’ view of participation 
compared to Proclus’.
Maximus’ framework of participation in Centuries of Theology 1.48-50
Centuries!of!Theology 1.48-50 forms a particular grouping within the whole 
work which is concerned with what constitutes being a work of God, what kinds 
of works exist, and in what sense God is related to those works. 1.48 introduces 
two particular kinds of works that belong to God:
For the worthy it should be sought out how certain things are fit to be understood as 
works which God began in creation, and again certain things which God did not begin. 
For if he rested from all works which he began to produce, it is clear he did not rest 
from those which he did not begin to produce. At no time then: the works of God, on 
the one hand, which began to be in time are all participating beings, just as the different 
essences of beings. For they have non-being prior to their own being; God was at some 
From!Iamblichus!to!Eriugena:!An!Investigation!of!the!Prehistory!and!Evolution!of!the!Pseudo-
Dionysian!Tradition (Leiden, 1978).
2 Prior studies of these passages (that I am currently aware of) are John Demetracopoulos, 
‘Palamas Transformed: Palamite Interpretations of the Distinction Between God’s “Essence” and 
“Energies” in Late Byzantium’, Bibliotheca 11 (2011), 263-372, 279 n. 46; David Bradshaw, 
Aristotle!East!and!West (Cambridge, 2004), 189-90; and David Bradshaw, ‘Maximus the Confessor’, 
in Lloyd Gerson (ed.), The!Cambridge!History!of!Philosophy!in!Late!Antiquity (Cambridge, 2012), 
816-7. While Proclus is briefly mentioned in these, there is no focused comparison of the concepts.
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point, when beings which participate were not. But the works of God which did not 
happen to begin to be in time are participated beings, which participating beings partake 
according to grace: just as with goodness, and everything of goodness if it is embraced 
by account. And simply all life, immortality, simplicity, immutability, and infinity; such 
things are contemplated in an essential way around him. Those are also works of God, 
and they did not begin in time. (1100C-D)3
45#5#*," #,67 .8,9:$/,37, #/"$ ($';(&3 ",&6" &<"$3 #= >12$ ?" @1A$#, #B7 2&"*-
.&C7 D E&F7G ($H #/"$ 8)I3", ?" ,-( @1A$#,. JK 2=1 8)"#C" ($#*8$9.& #L" >12C", 
?" @1A$#, 8,3B.$3, :BI," 0(&/"C" ,- ($#*8$9.&", ?" ,-( @1A$#, 8,3B.$3. M;8,#& 
,N", >12$ %O" E&,P +1,"3(L7 Q12%*"$ #,P &<"$/ 0.#3, 8)"#$ #= !"#$ %&#*+,"#$G 
,R," $S :3)T,1,3 #L" !"#C" ,-./$3. UV 2=1 %W !", >+,9.3 $-#L" #,P &<"$3 81&.XY#&-
1,". Z" 2)1 8,#&, [#& #= !"#$ %&#*+,"#$ ,-( \". E&,P :O >12$ #9+V" ,-( Q12%*"$ 
#,P &<"$3 +1,"3(L7, #= !"#$ %&'&(#=, ?" ($#= +)13" %&#*+,9.3 #= !"#$ %&#*+,"#$G 
,R,", ] ^2$'F#57, ($H 8_" &` #3 ^2$'F#5#,7 0%8&13*+&#$3 IF2a. b$H c8IL7 8_.$ 
dCW, ($H ^'$"$./$ ($H c8IF#57 ($H ^#1&e/$ ($H ^8&31/$, ($H [.$ 8&1H $-#V" ,-.3-
C:L7 '&C1&6#$3G f#3"$ ($H >12$ E&,P &K.3, ($H ,-( Q12%*"$ +1,"3(L7.
The main concern Maximus sets out in the beginning is that God is perpetu-
ally working even if he ‘rested’ in completing the creation of beings in time. 
It is within the specification of this aim that Maximus states the two kinds of 
divine works which God carries out: those which have a created beginning in 
time (works from which God rested) and those which are characterized by not 
having a beginning (g"$1+,7) in time (works from which God continually does 
not rest). Of particular note is Maximus’ focus on the essences (,-./$3) of 
beings as belonging to the former category of works which have a beginning, 
since they are conditioned by non-being (#V %W !") as their origin. Not only is 
the generation of these beings temporal but so also the essences of these beings. 
This would preclude an understanding of such essences as participated, eternal 
properties in the way transcendent Forms would be for a Platonist, particularly 
for Proclus. By contrast the other kinds of works which are eternal and outside 
time are perfections correlated to ‘goodness’ (] ^2$'F#57) and all other prop-
erties that have goodness in their definition: the properties of life, immortality, 
simplicity, and infinity,4 as mentioned in the following line. Maximus calls 
these participated beings (%&'&(#h) while referring to created beings having a 
beginning as participants (%&#&+F"#$) of these timeless properties. In this the 
division between being a participant and being participated lies in whether such 
a being or property is temporal or eternal. A participant being called ‘good’, 
‘living’, or even having ‘being’ is so not in virtue of itself but in virtue of its 
3 All translations are my own unless otherwise noted.
4 Maximus’ prioritization of ‘goodness’ (^2$'i#57) over the other attributes reflects a com-
mon Neoplatonic theme of the Good’s priority over all other attributes. See for instance Proclus, 
Elements!of!Theology, Prop. 8 (Dodds 8.29-30): ‘All that in any way participates the Good is 
subordinate to the first Good, which is nothing other than good’ (8h"#C" #L" D8C.,P" #,P 
^2$',P %&#&+i"#C" ]2&6#$3 #V 81j#C7 ^2$'V" ($H :k %5:l" 0.#3" gII, m ^2$'i").
140 J. GREIG
participation in the timeless works corresponding to those terms. Centuries!of!
Theology 1.50 makes this clearer:
And those which did begin in time are, and are said to be this, by participation of those 
things which did not begin in time, wherefore they both are and are said to be. For all 
living things and immortal things, both holy and virtuous things, God is the craftsman: 
for he transcends the essence of all that can be understood and spoken. (1101B)
b$H #= %O" Q12%*"$ +1,"3(L7, #n %&#,+n #L" ,-( Q12%*"C" +1,"3(L7 &K.3 ($H 
I*2,"#$3 #,P'o [8&1 ($H &K.H ($H I*2,"#$3. p).57 2=1 dCB7 ($H ^'$"$./$7, c23F#5-
#F7 #& ($H ^1&#B7, :5%3,912F7 0.#3" D E&F7G q8O1 ,-./$" 2=1 8)"#C" #L" #& 
",,9%*"C" ($H I&2,%*"C" 0Ar15#$3.
By implication, both participated and participating works fall in the category 
of what can be understood and spoken, which further confirms the sense of 
God’s transcendence as denying any attribution of positive properties or names 
which comes from the domain of either participated or participating beings. 
In this, God transcends all beings and being itself, where the works have the 
account of being predicated to them.5
1.48 presents a paradox where Maximus says that the participated works are 
contemplated ‘in an essential way’ (,-.3C:L7) around God (8&1H $-#i").6 
Initially this suggests some form of identity between God himself and the par-
ticipated works, which is at odds with the implication that God has no positive, 
and therefore essential, attributes. The use of 8&1s can either suggest spatial 
imagery (e.g. the moon as ‘around’ the earth) or conceptual relation (e.g. 
speaking of rationality ‘concerning’ or ‘in relation to’ man). The latter usage 
is suggested with Maximus relating the participated works essentially to God, 
but God’s absolute transcendence over all things ‘infinitely infinite times’ 
(^8&31)(37 ^8&/1C7) (1.49, 1101A)7 implies the former usage with ontological 
separation. The dual-sided ambiguity of the term would fit with the intermediate 
status that the participated works have between God in himself and the created, 
participating works: to the degree the participated works are eternal and pre-
exist the creation of beings in time, they are related closely to God who is also 
eternal; yet insofar as the participated properties of ‘goodness’ and so on are 
5 See Maximus, Centuries!of!Theology 1.49, 1101A.
6 The phrase 8&1H $-#i" in relation to God recurs in earlier Fathers, for instance Gregory of 
Nyssa, Against!Eunomius 2.89, 102, 582, etc. See D. Bradshaw, ‘Maximus the Confessor’ (2010), 
817.
7 The language of ^8&31)(37 ^8&/1C7 is also found in Proclus’ Elements!of!Theology,!Prop. 1 
(Dodds 2.10-1), albeit in a case where Proclus states that nothing can be made up ‘from infinitely 
infinite things’ (0A ^8&31h(37 ^8&s1C"). See also Maximus, Centuries!of!Theology 1.1-2, 4, where 
God is described as, among other negative attributes, beyond ‘essence, power, and act’. This cor-
responds to a general Neoplatonic description of the One as beyond the same triad of essence, 
power, and act (see e.g. Proclus, Commentary!on!Parmenides 1070.15-1071.3 [Cousin], 1070.13-
1071.3 [Steel]). This is further proof that Maximus is working closely within a Neoplatonic 
framework for discussing God’s transcendence and causal relation.
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works of God and are participated by beings in time, they are distinct and 
separate from God. The aspect of essential relation in the former case can be 
further clarified with Maximus’ statement at the end of 1.48 that the partici-
pated works ‘have God most solely as the eternal generator of [their] being’ 
(,R$ #V" E&V" >+,9.$ #,P &<"$3 %,"t#$#," ^u:/C7 2&"";#,1$) (1101A). 
While the phrasing explicitly denies that the participated works come from any 
other source than God, it also suggests that they are not self-generated and 
self-subsisting in the same way as the created works. Because of this, the par-
ticipated works are directly correlated to God even if still ontologically distinct 
from God. One can see evidence for this later in 1.54 when Maximus speaks 
of ‘being’ and ‘life’ as properly belonging to God, where in partaking of these 
properties one ‘becomes God by deification’ (,R$ ($H $-#V7 2&"i%&",7 #n 
'&j.&3 '&i7) (1104B). Thus, a given entity’s participation in ‘life’ or ‘being’ 
is not correlated to separate, self-subsisting principles, ‘Life’ and ‘Being’, but 
rather directly to God-as-life and God-as-being.8 This further confirms the par-
ticipated works’ status as intermediaries between God and created beings.
Centuries!of!Theology 1.49 raises another, initial problem for the presenta-
tion we have so far had of the participated works pre-existing created beings. 
The participated works are here said to be immanent, having been ‘implanted 
for created beings according to grace, as much as some infused power’ (($#= 
+)13" #,67 2&2,"F.3" 0%8*T9(&", ,R$ #37 :Y"$%37 >%T9#,7) (1101A). Yet if 
the participated works are supposed to be eternal and separate according to their 
nature from 1.48, it is not clear how they can be simultaneously immanent. The 
first half of 1.49 gives an implicit answer when it establishes God as transcend-
ing all beings, both participated and participating, while at the end the timeless 
works’ immanence in created beings is used as a reason to say that those works, 
through their immanence, have ‘clearly proclaimed God in all things’ (#V" 0" 
8_.3 !"#$ E&V" :3$819./C7 (51Y##,9.$) (1101A).9 The participated works 
then appear to have two aspects: either in their association with God as trans-
cendent, and therefore belonging ‘solely’ to God, or in their relation to created 
beings as immanent powers. Created beings which have the properties of 
‘goodness’ and ‘being’ then have those properties as received ‘powers’ caused 
8 On this, Maximus is following Pseudo-Dionysius, Divine!Names 181.16-9, with the divine 
names correlating to the same entity, God, and not to separate divine entities: ‘We do not say that 
the Good is one thing, Being another, Life another, and Wisdom another, neither that there are 
many causes and other divine beings productive of different entities subordinated and existing in 
relation to one another, but that they are the wholly good processions of a single God and the 
divine names by which we call him by ourselves’ (,-( gII, :O &<"$3 #^2$'i" T5.3 ($H gII, 
#V v" ($H gII, #W" dCW" m #W" .,Ts$", ,-:O 8,II= #= $`#3$ ($H gIIC" gII$7 81$(#3(=7 
'&i#5#$7 q8&1&+,w.$7 ($H qT&3%l"$7, ^II’ x"V7 '&,P #=7 [I$7 ^2$'=7 81,i:,97 ($H #=7 8$1’ 
]%L" 0A9%",9%l"$7 '&C"9%s$7). See Stephen Gersh, ‘Ideas and Energies in Pseudo-Dionysius 
the Areopagite’, SP 15 (1984), 297-300, 300.
9 See also, e.g., Maximus, Centuries!of!Theology 1.82, which further develops how and why 
God transcends ‘all that can be understood and spoken’; cf. 1.83, 2.2 (1125C); 2.3.
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by the participated works in their distinct aspect as timeless and pre-existing. 
This balances off the claim of transcendence for God with the affirmation 
of God’s immanence through the timeless works’ transcendent and immanent 
activity on created beings.
Proclus’ framework of participation
Proclus’ three-term framework for participation is established most succinctly 
in his Elements!of!Theology, Proposition 23, which states:
All!that!is!unparticipated!gives!existence!to!the!participated!from!itself,!and!all!partici-
pated!entities!reach!upwards!to!unparticipated!entities.
For the unparticipated, having the status of a monad since it belongs to itself and not 
to another, and since it transcends the participants, generates entities that are able to be 
participated. For either it will stand barren by itself – and then not have honor – or it 
will give something from itself. Then that which receives participates, and that which 
is given has existence as participated. (Dodds 26.22-9)
8_" #V ^%*'&(#," qT/.#5.3" ^Tk x$9#,P #= %&#&+F%&"$, ($H 8_.$3 $S %&#&+F%&"$3 
q8,.#).&37 &K7 ^%&'*(#,97 q8)1A&37 ^"$#&/","#$3.
#V %O" 2=1 ^%l'&(#,", %,"h:,7 >+," Ii2," y7 x$9#,P v" ($H ,-( gII,9 ($H y7 
0Az15%l"," #L" %&#&+i"#C", ^8,2&""{ #= %&#l+&.'$3 :9"h%&"$. m 2=1 g2,"," 
x.#|A&#$3 ($'’ $q#i, ($H ,-:O" }" >+,3 #s%3,"· m :j.&3 #3 ^T’ x$9#,P, ($H #V %O" 
I$XV" %&#l.+&, #V :O :,'O" q8l.#5 %&#&+,%l"C7.
Here, Proclus takes for granted that, for any given number of individuals 
sharing a property, the source of that property generates entities or principles 
which proximately impart their common effect in the participants. Whereas 
a more traditional Platonist framework admits of two terms – multiple par-
ticipants correlated to one participated entity or Form – Proclus thinks par-
ticipation in one source necessitates intermediate, participated principles 
which each correspond with their respective participants.10 For instance, each 
living body participates in the property of self-movement through its proxi-
mate particular soul, while each particular soul related to its body is generated 
from the monadic, unparticipated principle of Soul, which is the source of the 
property of self-movement. Under this description the unparticipated has a 
one-to-many relationship with the participated, while the participated has a 
one-to-one relationship to the participant: the unparticipated Soul produces 
multiple, particular souls which act as immediate causes of life to all living 
bodies, while the individual participated soul produces its effect in one particular 
living body.
10 See Proclus, Elements!of!Theology, Prop. 23, Dodds 26.30-28.7.
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Within this general three-term framework, Proclus makes a further distinc-
tion with the participated intermediary’s relation to its participant: each par-
ticipated entity is self-complete and self-constituted, and thus separate from its 
participant, while the participated generates its effect in the participant as an 
immanent power.11 From the previous example, each particular soul stands as 
self-complete in relation to the living body, while it also generates an imma-
nent power in the body which brings about the manifested effect of life, or 
self-movement, in that body. As Proclus states in Elements!of!Theology Prop. 
81: ‘All that is separately participated is present to the participant through an 
unseparated power which it implants’ (8_" #V +C13.#L7 %&#&+i%&"," :3h 
#3",7 ^+C1s.#,9 :9"h%&C7, ~" 0":s:C.3, # %&#l+,"#3 8h1&.#3") (Dodds 
76.12-3). As was the case with the participated term playing an intermediary 
role between the unparticipated and participants, so Proclus also posits an 
 intermediate power in the participant which makes the separately participated 
entity’s effect manifested. Thus within the participated-participant relationship 
Proclus has a further intermediary principle with the immanent power which 
manifests the final effect in the participant.
Perhaps more important in the comparison with Maximus is addressing how 
Proclus characterizes the distinction between participated and unparticipated 
entities. As Elements! of! Theology, Prop. 23, showed, the unparticipated 
corresponds to what belongs to all, while the participated corresponds to what 
belongs to one individual or participant. But how does Proclus justify this 
ontological distinction in the first place? The end of Prop. 23 provides an 
answer with the participated’s characterization:
Every participated entity, belonging to that through which it is participated, is second-
ary to that which is equally present to all and has filled everything from itself. For that 
which is in one is not in the others; while that which is present to all alike, so that it 
may illuminate all, is not in one but before all. ... But that which is in all would be 
divided into all, and again would require another principle to unify the divided; and 
further all would no longer participate the same principle, but this one and that another, 
through the unity being divided. (Dodds 26.30-28.4)
#V :O %&#&+i%&"," 8_", #3"V7 2&"i%&"," qT’ , %&#l+&#$3, :&w#&1i" 0.#3 #,P 8_.3" 
D%,sC7 8$1i"#,7 ($H 8h"#$ ^T’ x$9#,P 8I51j.$"#,7. #V %O" 2=1 0" x"H v" 0" #,67 
gII,37 ,-( >.#3"· #V :O 8_.3" y.$w#C7 8$1i", "$ 8_.3" 0IIh%8z, ,-( 0" x"s 
0.#3", ^II= 81V #L" 8h"#C". ... ^II= #V %O" 0" 8_.3" !", %&13.'O" &K7 8h"#$, 8hI3" 
gII,9 }" :l,3#, #,P #V %&13.'O" x"sd,"#,7· ($H ,-(l#’ }" #,P $-#,P %&#l+,3 8h"#$, 
^II= #V %O" gII,9, #V :O gII,9, #,P x"V7 %&13.'l"#,7.
11 See ibid. Prop. 64, Dodds 60.20-2: ‘Every original monad gives substance to two series: 
one of self-complete substances, the other of irradiated things which acquire their substance in 
others’ (8_.$ ^1+3(W :3##V" qTs.#5.3" ^13'%i", #V" %O" $-#,#&IL" q8,.#h.&C", #V" :O 
0IIh%e&C" 0" x#l1,37 #W" q8i.#$.3" (&(#5%l"C").
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Proclus characterizes each participated entity as being divided and distinct 
from each other, so that what one individual participates is different in an 
essential way from any other participated entity.12 The unparticipated functions 
as a source for all participants by being absolutely identical with itself in a way 
that negates all difference or division implied with the collected set of partici-
pated entities. The unparticipated thus unites within itself the multiple, distinct 
participated entities by its pure unity – whether as the kind, Soul, or also the 
transcendent Form of ‘man’.13 This requirement for absolute unity as a prior 
ground to the multiple, distinct participated terms is why Proclus emphasizes 
the status of the participated terms’ source as unparticipated, while the partici-
pated principles fulfill the role of an intermediary in conveying their common 
attribute, derived from the unparticipated, to the participants.
Comparing Maximus with Proclus
By comparison to Proclus’ elaborate layout and description of participation, 
Maximus’ Centuries!of!Theology 1.48-50 only gives us a sketch for his frame-
work of participation. A basic parallel nevertheless exists between both frame-
works insofar as Maximus also employs the same kind of a three-term division 
from Proclus in his division between God-as-transcendent, the participated, 
timeless works (%l'&(#$, or %&#&+i%&"$), and the participating, created works 
(%&#l+$).14 Maximus does not ascribe the term, ‘unparticipated’ (^%l'&(#,"), 
to God in 1.48-50,15 although his description of God as transcending the par-
ticipating and participated works fits the same description of the unparticipated 
transcending both kinds of entities from Proclus.16 The pre-existence of the 
participated works before created, participating beings mirrors Proclus’ state-
ment that participated entities exist separately and in themselves before their 
participants. More proximately, this may correspond to Proclus’ Prop. 63 in the 
Elements!of!Theology: ‘Every unparticipated entity gives existence to two orders 
of participated beings: one in those which participate at some time, another in 
those which participate always and by their nature’ (8_" #V ^%l'&(#," :3##=7 
12 Proclus specifies this distinction in terms of either species, for non-material entities (like 
souls), or number for material forms (like the enmattered form of ‘man’). See Commentary!on!
Parmenides 819.20-2 (Cousin), 819.14-6 (Steel); Commentary!on!Timaeus I 446.24-6.
13 See Proclus, Commentary!on!Parmenides 850-2 (Cousin, Steel).
14 Maximus, Centuries!of!Theology 1.48-50, and the rest of the Centuries generally use only 
%l'&(#," to refer to participated entities. Proclus primarily uses %&#&+i%&",", although in places 
like Elements!of!Theology, Prop. 63, Dodds 60.5, he uses the latter term interchangeably with the 
former (Dodds 60.1-2). Otherwise in the case of Prop. 63, neither term appears to differ in meaning 
from the other.
15 On doing a word search in Migne’s Patrologia!Graecae, no mention of ^%l'&(#," can be 
found in the Centuries!of!Theology or anywhere in the rest of Maximus’ corpus.
16 See also Proclus, Elements!of!Theology, Prop. 75.
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qTs.#5.3 #L" %&#&+,%l"C" #=7 #hA&37, #W" %O" 0" #,67 8,#O %&#l+,9.3, #W" 
:O 0" #,67 ^&H ($H .9%T9L7 %&#l+,9.3) (Dodds 60.1-3). For Proclus, all things 
which temporally participate in some property depend on a prior, eternally 
existing order of participated principles. To this degree Maximus has a similar 
idea with the participated works as existing eternally before they can be par-
taken by temporal beings.
Just as Maximus has two different descriptions of the participated works as 
either transcending or being immanent in their participants, Proclus also holds 
that participated entities which exist separately produce an immanent power in 
their participants which brings about the final effect from the participated 
entity. Similarly, Maximus speaks of the timeless works in Centuries!of!The-
ology 1.49 as an ‘infused power’ (#37 :Y"$%37 >%T9#,7) which manifests the 
properties of the participated works – or as Maximus explicitly says afterward, 
they have ‘clearly proclaimed God in all things’ (#V" 0" 8_.3 !"#$ E&V" 
:3$819./C7 (51Y##,9.$) (1101A). The description of ‘infused power’ also 
matches Proclus’ Elements!of!Theology, Prop. 81, which speaks of the separately 
participated ‘implanting’ (0":s:C.3) a non-separate power in the participant.17
Given that Maximus employs the same general framework, some important 
differences from Proclus should be noted. While Proclus speaks of participated 
entities as having a one-to-one correspondence with their respective participants, 
this contrasts with Centuries!of!Theology 1.48’s presentation of each partici-
pated work being correlated with multiple participants: for instance, multiple 
beings having the property of goodness participate in the one participated 
work of ‘goodness’.18 In this respect Maximus simplifies the framework by not 
including a separate intermediary between participated ‘goodness’ and an indi-
vidual having the received property of ‘goodness’, as would analogously be 
the case from Elements!of!Theology, Prop. 23. At the same time Maximus fol-
lows Proclus in Centuries!of!Theology 1.49’s description of an intermediary 
power generated in each participant from the participated source, where the 
power implicitly links the separately participated source with the participant. 
In Maximus’ case the separately-existing, participated source for a given prop-
erty is common to all participants of that property, and not just one as with 
Proclus.
17 Consider also Maximus’ distinction between the participated and participating in terms of 
being either contingent (8,#l) or without beginning in time (,-( Q12%*"$ +1,"3(L7) in Centuries!
of!Theology 1.48 (1100D), which parallels Proclus’ Elements!of!Theology, Prop. 63 (esp. Dodds 
60.4-11), where the unparticipated produces two sets of participated entities: those which are 
always (^&s) participated, and those which are contingently (8,#l) participated.
18 See Centuries!of!Theology 1.50, 1101B, where Maximus describes ‘all good things and good-
ness itself; and all beings and being itself manifestly beforehand happen to be works of God’ (($H 
#= ^2$'= 8)"#$, ($H $-#W ] ^2$'F#57G ($H #= !"#$ 8)"#$, ($H $-#W ] "#F#57, E&,P 81,:;IC7 
>12$ #92+)",9.3"). The balance between ‘all [X] things and [X] itself’ can be seen to correspond 
to participated beings with the given property, X, and the participated principle, ‘X’ itself.
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This leaves an open question with how to place God in the analogous role of 
the unparticipated for Maximus. Whereas the unparticipated for Proclus is 
related to its corresponding participated entities as being one of that kind – for 
instance, unparticipated Soul is one in kind with the participated souls it pro-
duces – it is initially not clear how God is related to the participated works as 
a source in Maximus’ framework: what God is productive of is not simply one 
kind of thing (divinity, for instance) for the participated works, but rather good-
ness, life, being, and so on, which differ in kind from what God is in himself. 
While this phrasing indicates an explicit difference between the two figures, in 
a certain sense Maximus still follows Proclus: as shown earlier with Centuries!
of!Theology!1.54, one’s participation in the properties of ‘being’ and ‘life’ to 
their full degree implies becoming ‘God by deification’, since they properly 
belong to God in himself.19 One way to characterize this under Proclus’ frame-
work is that Maximus’ participated works are united in kind under the property 
of divinity or deity, which is located in God as the source, while the participated 
works are differing manifestations under the same character of divinity. In one 
way this also matches Proclus’ understanding of all things ultimately being 
characterized as manifestations of unity, which is found in the transcendent first 
principle of the One.20 More proximately, Proclus’ doctrine of the henads might 
better fit the comparison,21 where the henads stand as intermediate, participated 
principles of oneness between the One-itself and all beings: for instance, behind 
the unparticipated monad of Soul stands a henad responsible as the proximate 
source of Soul’s unity; similarly for Being, there is a henad for Being’s unity; 
and so on. To the degree that the henads are different aspects of the One-itself, 
Maximus’ notion of the participated works as aspects of God would also fit.22 
At the same time a certain proviso is needed: whereas Proclus calls the henads 
‘gods’ and therefore separate deities, Maximus denies this to the participated 
works in Centuries!of!Theology 1.50 with his strong emphasis on God as the 
‘craftsman’ (:5%3,912F7) of both created and timeless works.
One extra difference to note between Maximus and Proclus is the ontological 
status of the participated entities. For Proclus, Elements!of!Theology, Prop. 64’s 
description of the first order of participated entities as ‘self-complete’ ($-#,#&IL") 
indicates self-subsistence and ontological separation from the participants and 
19 Maximus the Confessor, Centuries!of!Theology 1.54, 1104B.
20 See Proclus, Elements!of!Theology, Prop. 5.
21 I would like to thank Kevin Corrigan for this suggestion, which has also been pointed out 
in Pseudo-Dionysian studies (e.g.!Timothy Riggs, ‘Erôs, the Son, and the Gods as Metaphysical 
Principles in Proclus and Dionysius’, Dionysius!28 [2010], 97-130).
22 Of course, even here the comparison breaks where Proclus speaks of the henads as ineffable 
and beyond positive description, like the One itself (see Proclus, Elements!of!Theology,!Prop. 115, 
118). This would indicate another ‘flattening’ of horizons under Maximus’ framework, where 
Being-itself and the henad of ‘Being’ are collapsed in one participated work of ‘being’, as with 
Life-itself and the henad of ‘Life’ into the work of ‘life’, etc.
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the unparticipated source.23 As seen earlier, the separate existence of the par-
ticipated entities makes possible the distribution of a given property in the 
participants, where Proclus characterizes this pre-existence in terms of the prin-
ciple’s self-subsistence. Comparing with Maximus, while the participated 
works have pre-existence in relation to the participating works, the former do 
not appear to have a self-subsistent status in the same way. Maximus states in 
Centuries!of!Theology 1.48 that whereas God ‘rested’ (($#l8$9.&) from the 
works which have a beginning in time, God did not rest from the works which 
have no beginning – that is, the participated works. The previous passage of 
Centuries!of!Theology 1.47 provides some context for this ‘rest’, where the 
resulting product or work from which God rested has its own self-determined 
movement and activity.24 While this applies for the participating, created beings 
in Centuries!of!Theology 1.48, this is not the case for the participated works. 
If Proclus’ description of the participated entities as self-complete implies being 
self-determined, this constitutes another difference for Maximus where this is 
not the case. The former allows Proclus to call the henads, which are partici-
pated aspects of the One, separate gods, since they are self-complete and in this 
respect separate from each other and their source in the One.25 By contrast, the 
denial of being self-determined, and therefore self-complete, for Maximus’ par-
ticipated works would be reason to deny the attribution of separate deity to 
them, which follows on Maximus’ emphasis that such works essentially pertain 
to God as their sole source.
Conclusion
Overall, Maximus’ adaptation of Proclus on participation is rather simplified 
even though the basic structure is in place. Where Proclus employs his frame-
work of participation in positing multiple layers of reality between the first 
23 Dodds 60.31-62.2: ‘Accordingly those substances which are self-complete, while by their 
discrimination into a manifold they fall short of their original monad, are yet in some wise assim-
ilated to it by their self-complete existence; whereas the incomplete not only as existing in another 
fall away from the monad which exists in itself, but also as incomplete from the all-completing 
monad’ (trans. Dodds, lightly modified) ($S %O" ,N" $-#,#&I&67 q8,.#h.&37, :3= #W" &K7 8IB',7 
:3h(13.3" QI$##C%l"$3 #B7 ^1+3(B7 $-#L" %,"h:,7, :3= #W" $-#,#&IB 8$1A3" D%,3,P"#$s 
8z 81V7 0(&s"5"· $S :O ^#&I&67 ($H # 0" gII,37 &<"$3 #B7 ($'’ $q#W" qT&.#j.57 ($H # 
^#&I&6 #B7 8h"#$ #&I&3,w.57 ^T&.#|($.3").
24 See Centuries!of!Theology 1.47 1100B-C: ‘For God rests from his natural activity in each 
being by which each of them moves naturally. He rests when each being, having obtained the 
divine energy in due measure, will determine its own natural activity with respect to God’ (trans. 
Berthold) (p$Y&#$3 2=1 D E&V7 #B7 0" x().#a #L" !"#C" #9+V" T9.3(B7 0"&12&/$7, ($'o ~" 
($.#," #L" !"#C" T9.3(L7 (3"&6.'$3 8*T9(&", D8F#$" ($.#," #B7 '&/$7 ^"$IF2C7 083I$-
XF%&"," 0"&12&/$7, #W" ($#= TY.3" ,K(&/$" 8&1H $-#V" D1/.z #V" E&V" 0"*12&3$").
25 See Proclus, Elements!of!Theology, Prop. 114.
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principle, intelligible entities, entities of soul, and material being, Maximus 
gives a more flattened, straightforward hierarchy in Centuries!of!Theology 1.48-
50. This may be why Maximus, unlike Proclus, does not hold that each par-
ticipated entity belongs to the same kind – that is, being, life, goodness, and so 
on – except insofar as they share in the common property of divinity, or rather 
as participated aspects of God. In this, perhaps the crucial difference from 
Proclus lies in Maximus’ denial of self-subsistence to the participated works in 
their eternal, pre-existing aspect. On the one hand this move blocks calling the 
participated works separate divinities, as Proclus would with the participated 
henads, but then how these participated works subsist otherwise is not clear if 
they are still distinct from God in his absolute transcendence.26 Nevertheless, 
Maximus’ affirmation of the participated works as intermediaries fills a require-
ment similarly seen in Proclus’ framework, where they mediate properties 
derived from one transcendent source to participating individuals. In Maximus’ 
case with the Centuries!of!Theology, they fill the conceptual background to 
explain the language of deification and how things become perfected by God 
through participation.27
26 For instance, Proclus would say that a thing has subsistence either as a power in its prior 
cause, as constituting itself as a separate existence, or as immanent in the resulting product (see 
Proclus, Elements!of!Theology, Prop. 65). While the middle category of self-subsistence is denied, 
it is unclear where Maximus might place the participated works-as-pre-existing, particularly if he 
wishes to maintain the transcendence of God in a way that denies any identity with the participated 
works. In terms of later developments, D. Bradshaw, Aristotle!East!and!West (2004), 189-90 points 
out a parallel with Gregory Palamas’ distinction between God’s essence (,-.s$) and energies (0"l1-
2&3$3). Maximus’ framework may perhaps lead in this direction, particularly if ‘rest’ is denied to 
God’s ‘works’ (>12$) in their eternal aspect, as seen earlier. If Maximus is taken as a faithful 
interpreter of Ps.-Dionysius in this area, pace S. Gersh, ‘Ideas and Energies in Pseudo-Dionysius 
the Areopagite’ (1984), 300, this might constitute a new ontological category for the participated 
entities, insofar as their ontological status is modified from Proclus while still yet distinct from 
God in himself.
27 Special thanks to Peter Adamson, Kevin Corrigan, Alan Brown, Augustine Casiday, Denis 
Walter, Daniel Watson, and Dimitrios Vasilakis for their feedback and suggestions for this article.
